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INTRODUCTION 
Because the parties do not disagree on the issues 
presented on appeal, the statement of the case, or the statement 
of facts, replies by P.O.S.T. to those portions of Ms. Doe's 
responsive brief are unnecessary. However, P.O.S.T. will reply 
to the argument presented in that brief. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT 
It is obvious that at least one purpose for the 
legislature's enactment of the current expungement statute and 
its predecessor was to enhance the employment opportunities of 
ex-offenders. Moreover, there is no dispute that, under the 
current law, an employer cannot require disclosure of an expunged 
conviction by an applicant for a job. The language of UTAH CODE 
ANN. S 77-18-2(3) (19 82) makes that clear. The issue in this 
case, however, is not whether an employer may inquire about 
expunged convictions; rather, the question is: Can a 
governmental agency like P.O.S.T. consider expunged convictions 
in performing its legislatively mandated licensing function? 
In her responsive brief Ms. Doe offers no compelling 
reason why this Court should ignore the plain language of § 77-
18-2, which only restricts inquiries by employers about expunged 
convictions, and rule that P.O.S.T. may not require disclosure of 
convictions expunged under that statute by applicants for peace 
officer certification. She fails to explain how P.O.S.T. falls 
within the ambit of the term "employer" or upon what basis this 
Court could interpret § 77-18-2(3) to apply to P.O.S.T. The 1980 
amendments to the expungement statute are most reasonably 
interpreted as reflecting a legislative intent to limit the 
effect of an expungement — i.e., to limit it to inquiries from 
employers.1 That, of course, would not include inquiries from 
state licensing agencies, even though licensing may be a 
prerequisite to a particular type of employment. The very 
purpose of licensing is to ensure that only qualified persons 
practice certain professions, hold certain positions, or engage 
in particular activities. The public's interest in ensuring that 
only persons with a high standard of fitness and character 
function as peace officers in this state is reflected in the 
peace officer certification statutes. In The Matter of the 
Discharge of Wayne L. Jones# 35 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 10, P.2d , 
(1986) (noting § 67-15-10.5(1) (e) and the paramount interest 
1
 Interestingly, in the affidavit of Ronald N. Boyce, which Ms. 
Doe relies upon to support her position (Brief of Respondent, 
Appendix C), Professor Boyce suggests that § 77-18-2(3) might not 
apply to the situation where an ex-offender applies for a 
sensitive government position. This suggests that the intended 
scope of that provision was even more narrow than the plain 
language suggests — i.e., not all employers would be barred from 
requiring disclosure of expunged convictions. 
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in the appearance of integrity in a peace officer) . This Court 
itself has recognized that Miln the sensitive area of law 
enforcement a police officer's reputation of high moral character 
and his credibility as a witness in his frequent appearances in 
the courts of law are essential to his effective performance of 
his duty." Clearfield City v. Department of Employment Security, 
663 P.2d 440, 442 (Utah 1983). Accordingly, beyond the plain 
language of § 77-18-2, which when read literally would not 
prohibit inquiries by P.O.S.T. about expunged convictions, sound 
public policy demands that criminal convictions be available for 
consideration in deciding whether a particular individual should 
be vested with the powers and responsibilities of a peace 
officer. 
Ms. Doe's contention that "Itlhe effect of allowing 
P.O.S.T to consider the past expunged convictions of an offender 
is to bar that individual from state employment, in general," 
Brief of Respondent at 9, is unfounded. Although it is true that 
an individual may be barred from peace officer positions, there 
are numerous state and other governmental positions that would 
not require licensing or certification like that received through 
P.O.S.T. 
Ms. Doe's additionial assertion that P.O.S.T.'s 
requirement that expunged convictions be disclosed violates § 77-
-3-
18-2(4),2 is without merit. P.O.S.T.f by requiring disclosure, 
is not seeking to inspect the sealed records; it merely is asking 
the individual to provide a complete criminal history. 
Finally, implicit in Ms. Doe's argument is that, if 
P.O.S.T. is allowed to consider her expunged convictions, she 
will necessarily be denied certification, and a court's previous 
determination of suitability for police work will effectively be 
overruled. These claims simply are not true. Sections 67-15-
10.5(1) (d) and (e) give the director of P.O.S.T. the discretion 
to deny certification to an individual if that individual has 
been convicted of a certain type of crime or is guilty of other 
disqualifying conduct; they do not require denial of 
certification under those circumstances. Under current P.O.S.T 
procedures, the individual whose certification is being addressed 
under § 67-15-10.5 is entitled to appear at a probable cause 
hearing before a three person committee3 where an initial 
decision is made on whether to send the case on to the P.O.S.T. 
Council or to grant or maintain the individual's certification. 
If the case is sent on to the Council, the individual may appear 
at a hearing before that body. At both the probable cause and 
Council hearing stages, the individual may present whatever 
2
 Section 77-18-2(4) provides: 
Inspections of the sealed records shall be permitted by 
the court only upon petition by the person who is the subject of 
those records and only to the persons named in the petition. 
3 The probable cause committee is appointed by the chairman of 
the P.O.S.T. Council. Currently, the committee is made up of two 
chiefs of police and a citizen, none of whom are employees of 
P.O.S.T. or members of the Council. 
-4-
evidence he or she has in support of certification. The director 
of P.O.S.T. may not denyf suspend, or revoke certification 
without "concurrence of the majority of the council." § 67-15-
10.5(1). These procedures provide the individual with a fair 
process for resolving peace officer certification issues, and 
represent an intelligent approach to the problem of ensuring that 
the citizens of this state have a police force that is marked by 
professionalism and integrity. 
Furthermore, although a court's determination that an 
ex-offender is sufficiently rehabilitated to receive an 
expungement under § 77-18-2 is significant when that individual 
applies for peace officer certification, the expungement decision 
generally is not made on the basis of whether the person would be 
qualified to become a peace officer. It simply is not realistic 
to assume that the expunging court focused on the concerns 
inherent in the peace officer certification statutes. The degree 
of rehabilitation required for an expungement under § 77-18-2 
should logically be somewhat less than that required to attain 
peace officer status. The members of P.O.S.T. and the P.O.S.T. 
Council, who presumably have greater specialized knowledge about 
law enforcement training and personnel than does the average 
judge, are better equipped than are the courts to decide which of 
those individuals who have been convicted of crimes, whether or 
not the convictions have been expunged, should receive peace 
officer certification. Therefore, there is no impermissible 
abridgement of judicial prerogative if P.O.S.T. considers 
expunged convictions in performing its certification function. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reply to Ms. Doe's argument 
and the arguments set forth in P.O.S.T.'s opening brief, this 
Court should reverse the district court's order and rule that 
P.O.S.T. and the P.O.S.T. Council may properly consider 
convictions expunged under § 77-18-2 in deciding whether to 
revoke, suspend, or deny certification under §§ 67-15-10.5(1) (d) 
and (e) . y' ——-
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